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CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
by
William V Dorsaneo, 111*
T HE careful reader will note a change in the title of this year's Survey
Article. The change reflects an increased emphasis on consumer law
begun last year when the Article was expanded to include developments
under the Deceptive Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act' and the
Texas Consumer Credit Code.' This approach has been continued this
year. Expanded treatment has also been given to the subject of sworn ac-
count practice because of significant case law development during the sur-
vey period concerning the proper method of interpreting the scope of
sworn account practice under rule 185 of the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
I. EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES AND EXECUTION
A. Garnishment
A variety of garnishment cases were decided during the survey period.
In Curry Motor Freight, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.3 a garnishee sought to
set aside a default judgment by writ of error. The court of civil appeals
reversed the default judgment because the officer's return did not state the
manner of service.' The court held that it was immaterial that the defend-
ant may have had actual knowledge of the existence of the suit and the
issuance of the writ of garnishment.'
The propriety of a default judgment against a garnishee whose answer is
not in strict compliance with the rules governing answers in garnishment
cases was considered in Healy v. Wick Building Systems, Inc.6 Although
the procedural posture of the case was somewhat complicated, the central
question presented pertaining to garnishment was whether the garnishee's
answer was rendered insufficient as a matter of law by his failure to re-
spond to the inquiry of whether he knew of other persons who were in-
debted to the debtor.7 The Dallas court of civil appeals concluded that
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Texas. Associate Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University.
I, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
2. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069 (Vernon 1971).
3. 565 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
4. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107, 663. See also Jacksboro Nat'l Bank v. Signal Oil & Gas Co.,
482 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ).
5. 565 S.W.2d at 107.
6. 560 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
7. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 659, 666, 667.
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when a garnishee answers with respect to the merits of the writ, but fails to
answer as to his knowledge of other persons who may be indebted to the
debtor, no judgment by default is authorized.'
In Hardy v. Construction Systems, Inc.9 the court stated the general rule
that property in custodia legis is not subject to garnishment, but held that
such exemption ceases when a court has entered a judgment ordering the
distribution of the property and nothing remains for the custodian to do
but make delivery or payment to the distributees.'0 In Hardy the judg-
ment ordering distribution had become final prior to the time garnishment
was sought;" thus, garnishment in this instance was found to be proper.
The propriety of garnishing an agency or instrumentality of the United
States was also dealt with in several cases during the survey period. In
United Slates v. Steller' 2 the Texas Supreme Court construed a federal
statute that removed the government's sovereign immunity from suits to
enforce "legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony pay-
ments." ' 3 The supreme court held that an award to a woman of a portion
of her ex-husband's military retirement pay as her share of the community
estate could not be enforced by garnishment because it was awarded as a
community property division and not as "alimony" as defined in the stat-
ute.' 4 In United States v. Fleming'5 the wife had a claim for unpaid child
support and sought to garnish the military retirement pay of her ex-spouse
to satisfy the claim. The garnishee, however, contended that military re-
tirement pay was exempt from garnishment under Texas law as current
wages for personal services.6 The court of civil appeals disagreed and
held that the military retirement pay constituted "property" and was sub-
ject to garnishment.' 7 The court of civil appeals, however, reversed the
trial court judgment as an unconstitutional taking of property under the
fourteenth amendment.' 8 Before a judgment against the garnishee is au-
thorized, the claim against the debtor must be reduced to a money judg-
8. 560 S.W.2d at 721; see American Express Co. v. Monfort Food Dist. Co., 545
S.W.2d 49, 52-53 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ).
9. 556 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston-[14th Dist.] 1977, no writ).
10. Id. at 844. In its opinion the court noted two early Texas Supreme Court decisions,
Curtis v. Ford, 78 Tex. 262, 14 S.W. 614 (1890), and Pace v. Smith, 55 Tex. 555 (1882), which
held that a writ of garnishment is never appropriate as to funds in the custody of a court.
The court of civil appeals stated that while the above mentioned cases had neer been specif-
ically overruled, it was convinced "that they no longer correctly express the law of this state"
and that the applicable rule in Texas was the one followed in the case. 556 S.W.2d at 844.
I1. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b, para. 5.
12. 567 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1978).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976). Prior to this statute, the government was immune from
garnishment proceedings authorized by state law. See Main v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230 (5th
Cir. 1977); Wilhelm v. United States Dep't of Air Force, Accounting & Fin. Center,*418 F.
Supp. 162 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
14. 567 S.W.2d at 798.
15. 565 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1978, no writ).
16. Id. at 88. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 23 ("No current wages for personal service
shall ever be subject to garnishment"); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (Vernon 1966).
17. 565 S.W.2d at 88-89.
18. Id. at 89.
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ment.19 The findings in the trial court to the effect that the husband was in
arrears did not amount to a judicial determination of the debt since "the
absence of [the husband] from the case because of lack of notice result[ed]
in the absence of an indispensable party," necessary to a valid judgment.2"
In other words, to allow the husband's property to be garnished here
would violate his due process rights, as it would constitute a prejudgment
garnishment without necessary procedural safeguards.2
A somewhat similar procedural fact situation was presented in Tom Ben-
son Chevrolet Co. v. Beall.2 The plaintiff obtained a default judgment
against the debtor on August 30, 1976, and instituted garnishment pro-
ceedings against the garnishee. Instead of paying the plaintiff, on Septem-
ber 9 the garnishee paid the primary defendant all sums owed. On
September 29 the default judgment was set aside and a new trial granted,
which resulted in another judgment being rendered against the primary
defendant on October 14. In May of the following year judgment was en-
tered for plaintiff against the garnishee for the amount of the first judg-
ment. On appeal, the court of civil appeals held that since the first
judgment had been set aside, and since the second judgment was rendered
after the writ of garnishment had been served and the property disposed
of, there was no judgment to support a writ of garnishment.23 The judg-
ment against the garnishee was therefore reversed and remanded. Appar-
ently, the only ground asserted to support the issuance of the writ was the
existence of a "valid and subsisting judgment."24
B. Sequestration
Two cases involving sequestration were decided during the survey term.
19. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (Vernon 1975), which enables the claimant to
reduce the claim to judgment. See note 21 infra.
20. 565 S.W.2d at 89.
21. For development of the fourteenth amendment in this context, see North Ga. Fin-
ishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), notedin 29 Sw. L.J. 660 (1975); Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc.,
504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). TEX. R. Civ. P. 663a
was recently promulgated to require notice to or joinder of the debtor. See generally Soules,
Attachment, Sequestration, and Garnishment.- The 1977 Rules, 32 Sw. L.J. 753 (1978). See
also Dorsaneo, Creditors' Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 245, 279-80
(1978). It should also be noted, however, that under Texas law, before judgment against the
garnishee is authorized, the main claim must be reduced to judgment. See, e.g., TEX. R.
Civ. P. 667, 668, 669. For a similar case, see Breedlove v. United States, 569 S.W.2d 582
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ), discussed in Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, p.466 in-
fra. It should also be observed that if military retirement pay is subject to garnishment in
Texas, certain federal restrictions on the amounts that can be garnished would be applicable.
15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (1976) provides that the maximum amount of an individual's aggre-
gate disposable earnings per work week that can be garnished to enforce an order for the
support of another person is limited to 50% of the individual's disposable earnings of that
week when that individual is supporting a spouse or dependent child other than one to
whom the support order pertains. When an individual is not supporting such a spouse or
child, the amount to be garnished cannot exceed 60% of weekly disposable earnings.
22. 567 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. Id. at 859.
24. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4076(3) (Vernon 1966).
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In Monroe v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.25 an interlocutory appeal
from an order overruling a motion to dissolve a writ of sequestration was
dismissed for the reason that in the absence of statutory authority, an ap-
peal lies only from a final judgment.26 In Barield v. Brogdon27 the ques-
tion was considered as to what constitutes the proper standard to be
employed in determining whether an award of exemplary damages should
be made in a wrongful sequestration action. In this case the court stated
that the key issue was a determination of legal malice. An issue submis-
sion inquiring whether the wrongdoer "knew or should have known that
he had no right to title or possession" of the sequestered property, how-
ever, did not properly submit to the jury the question of malice.28 The
majority held, however, that since the wrongdoer did not object to the jury
charge for failing to submit an issue "expressly inquiring if he acted with
malice," the right to complain had been waived.29 Consequently, the court
awarded exemplary damages based on the presence of reasonable evidence
of legal malice, but found the trial court's award of $3000 exemplary dam-
ages excessive and reduced the award by $2000.30
C. Homestead
The effect of the 1973 amendment to the Texas Constitution allowing a
single adult person a homestead 3' was construed in First Realty Bank &
Trust v. Youngkin. 32 The realty involved had been conveyed to the appel-
lee on July 3, 1972; thus, the conveyance was made prior to the time the
amendment had taken effect. The appellant bank had recovered a judg-
ment against the appellee in 1965. Moreover, the bank had obtained and
recorded its abstract of judgment in 1965 and again in 1974.33 The court
of civil appeals properly held that the judgment lien, which antedated the
homestead character of the subject realty, was not defeated by the after-
acquired homestead right.34
A similar question was presented in Shepler v. Kubena.3' Dan Shepler
purchased eighty acres of land in 1961. In that same year, he conveyed the
realty to a private corporation that he and his first wife operated. The
private corporation executed a deed of trust in favor of a savings and loan
association to secure a note of $25,000. Approximately six months later,
the appellant married Shepler, moved onto the subject property, and
25. 561 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
26. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2249 (Vernon 1971).
27. 560 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
28. Id. at 791.
29. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 274, 279. See also Allen v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 380
S.W.2d 604 (Tex. 1964). But see the dissent of Justice Reynolds in Barf6eld for a sound
argument that the claimant waived the ground of recovery on exemplary damages. 560
S.W.2d at 792-94.
30. 560 S.W.2d at 792.
31. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
32. 568 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, no writ).
33. Id. at 429.
34. Id. at 430.
35. 563 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
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treated that property as her homestead. Two years later, the private corpo-
ration, which still had title to the land, executed a second deed of trust to
secure payment of a note for $38,000, which carried forward the prior
$25,000 note and lien. The corporation then transferred the land to Shep-
ler, who later conveyed it to appellant. Thereafter, the savings and loan
association assigned the note to appellee, who then sought to foreclose
upon the deed of trust lien. The appellant asserted that the property con-
stituted her homestead and that the lien was invalid. The court of civil
appeals held that encumbrances placed on the property were not affected
by a later acquired homestead interest. At the time the lien arose the ap-
pellant was not the owner of the property, but had a mere possessory inter-
est as a tenant at will. With the interest of a mere tenant at will, the
appellant could not restrict the title owner, the private corporation, from
"encumbering the property which was not used by [the corporation] as its
homestead."36
In Minnehoma Financial Co. v. Ditto37 the appellant, who was the owner
and holder of a retail installment contract and security agreement, sought
a money judgment and a foreclosure of its security interest in a mobile
home. The mobile home was initially purchased on ninety-day credit by
the appellee from Interstate Housing Corporation (IHC), which had the
mobile home on consignment from the appellant. The home was delivered
to the appellee who removed its wheels and placed the home on concrete
blocks on his land. Thereafter, the appellee failed to pay the balance of
the purchase price prior to the expiration of the ninety-day period. As a
result, IHC and the appellee entered into the retail installment contract
and security agreement on November 1, 1973. This agreement was then
assigned to the appellant. Neither the original sales contract, nor the sub-
sequent installment contract and security agreement, were signed by the
appellee's wife. The trial court denied foreclosure of the security interest,
apparently on the appellee's theory that the purchase money security inter-
est was for an improvement to a homestead, which would require the sig-
nature of both spouses to be valid.38 The court of civil appeals rejected
appellee's argument for several reasons. First, under the terms of the con-
tracts, the mobile home did not become part of the homestead until the
purchase price was paid. Second, the court held that the requirement. of
both signatures "extends only to the creation of a lien on what was already
homestead at the time of the transaction."39 In rejecting the appellee's ar-
36. Id. at 386.
37. 566 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
38. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5460 (Vernon Supp.
1978-79).
39. 566 S.W.2d at 357. The court noted:
There is a crucial distinction between an improvement lien on the homestead
requiring two signatures and a purchase money lien which does not: In the
case of a purchase money lien, the lienfor purchase money is on the property
purchased, and both signatures are not required. An improvement lien re-
quiring both signatures is one which is for an improvement but is on the ex-
isting homestead.
Id. at 358. (Emphasis in original).
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gument that at the time of the November 1, 1973 "readjustment" of credit
terms the mobile home was part of the homestead, the court of civil ap-
peals appears to rely upon Machicek v. Barcak4 ° for the proposition that
the head of the family has the right to renew, rearrange, and readjust en-
cumbrances on a homestead.4 The court of civil appeals also concluded
that it was immaterial that the original seller, IHC, may have had notice
that the mobile home was to be attached to the appellee's land:"2
A case involving a fact situation somewhat similar to the Ditto case was
McGahey v. Ford.43 In McGahey the appellant sought to foreclose a deed
of trust lien on certain real estate that appellee claimed as homestead. The
deed of trust had been executed by the appellee's predecessor in interest in
the property, individually and on behalf of the predecessor's corporation.
On the date that the deed of trust was executed, record title to the realty
was vested, as shown by the deed records, in the corporation. The court of
civil appeals found that the transfer to the corporation by the appellee's
predecessor had been a "pretended sale" of the homestead property, and
was therefore void." Consequently, since the corporation had no title to
the property, its attempt to execute the deed of trust was also void. As a
result, the court ruled that the property retained its homestead character
and could not be mortgaged for any purpose other than purchase money
or improvements. 5 In response, the appellant argued that it was a bona
fide mortgagee for value because it had no notice that the deed to the cor-
poration was a pretended sale. The court of civil appeals concluded, how-
ever, that since appellant had advanced no new consideration for the deed
of trust, it did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
that the property conveyed was homestead. 6 It should be observed that
the homestead argument was made by the party who had bought the real
estate from the individual who made the "pretended sale" to the corpora-
tion. The purchaser, though not a party to the transfer to the corporation,
was held to be entitled to raise the homestead issue because "[a] void in-
strument has no effect, even as to persons not parties to it, and its invalidity
may be asserted by anyone whose rights are affected."
47
In Bank of Texas v. Laguarta41 the appellant had obtained a judgment
for the amount of $186,993.36 against the appellee in early 1977. After
obtaining a judgment lien on all of the appellee's nonexempt realty in Har-
ris County, the appellant convinced a constable to levy a writ of execution
on property that the appellee claimed as homestead. Appellant contended
that at the time of designation of the "homestead" in 1969, the value of the
40. 141 Tex. 165, 170 S.W.2d 715 (1943).
41. Id. at 169, 170 S.W.2d at 717.
42. 566 S.W.2d at 358.
43. 563 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50, which provides that "all pretended sales of home-
stead involving any condition of defeasance shall be void."
45. 563 S.W.2d at 862.
46. Id. at 863.
47. Id. at 861.
48. 565 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ).
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lot exceeded the $5,000 maximum homestead exemption then in effect, and
that the nonexempt portion exceeded the outstanding balance of any
purchase money mortgage.49 The appellee obtained a temporary injunc-
tion restraining the constable's sale. The court of civil appeals upheld the
injunction, concluding that despite the trial court's determination that the
value of the property was in excess of the applicable homestead exemption,
the question as to value should not be decided at a temporary injunction
hearing. 0 The court's clear suggestion that this type of question should be
resolved at either a permanent injunction hearing or a full trial makes it
highly doubtful that proof that property was homestead can ever be suc-
cessfully rebutted at a temporary injunction hearing.
In North Texas Production Credit Association v. Lee5 the question of the
entitlement of a bankrupt to a rural as opposed to an urban homestead was
considered. The bankrupt owned two tracts of land in Oak Grove, one
consisting of 193.99 acres and the other of 1.125 acres. The district court,
in reversing the bankruptcy judge, held that Oak Grove, which consisted
of thirteen houses, a convenience store, an abandoned church, and two
sawmills within a radius of six-tenths of a mile, was not a "village." Con-
sequently, the two-hundred-acre rural homestead exemption52 was appli-
cable in this instance. The district court reached its holding despite the
1934 decision in Buttram v. Harris5 3 in which it was determined that Oak
Grove was a village. The court stated that "the facts and circumstances
which gave life to the village [Oak Grove] in that year [1934] do not pres-
ently exist and are not binding upon the Court in deciding this case." 54 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
D. Execution
In Rio Delta Land Co. v. Johnson55 the appellant brought suit to set
aside a sheriffs sale, arguing that proper notice of the sale had not been
given and that the land had been sold at a grossly inadequate price. He
further alleged that a subsequent purchaser who had acquired the land
from the purchaser at the sheriffs sale was charged with knowledge of the
irregularities concerning the notice and that the sale to him was therefore
voidable. 6 The court of civil appeals agreed that since the sale was held
on a day less than twenty days from the date of the publication of the first
49. See Valley Bank v. Skeen, 401 F. Supp. 139, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1975), a dmem., 532
F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1977); In re Bobbitt, No. BK-3-74-373-F
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1976), discussed in Dorsaneo, Creditors' Rights, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 213, 225 (1977); Hoffman v. Love, 494 S.W.2d 591, 596-97 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 499 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1973).
50. 565 S.W.2d at 365.
51. 570 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1978).
52. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
53. 73 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1934).
54. 570 F.2d at 1303.
55. 566 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
56. Id. at 712.
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notice of sale,57 the sale was improper. There was a substantial conflict in
the testimony in the trial court, however, concerning whether the land in
question was sold for a grossly inadequate price. The trial court did not
find the price grossly inadequate, and held that the irregularity as to the
notice of sale did not affect the amount bid at the sheriff's sale. The court
of appeals affirmed, holding that the improper notice was insufficient to set
aside the sale absent a showing of gross inadequacy in the sale price. 8 In
addition, testimony in the trial court indicated that the purchaser at the
sheriff's sale offered to sell the land to appellant for the amount paid at the
sale plus expenses, but the offer was rejected by the appellant. 9 This reve-
lation undoubtedly influenced the trial and appellate courts' conclusions.
E. Receivership
Due process limitations on the ability of a receiver to take property into
actual custody when that property is in the possession of third parties were
considered in First National Bank v. State.6" Pursuant to the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, 6 ' the state instituted a receivership proceeding against
defendants who had funds deposited with the appellant bank. Shortly af-
ter the petition was filed, the state filed an ex parte motion alleging that the
receiver had attempted to take possession of the funds, but that the appel-
lant had refused to surrender them. The motion was granted requiring the
bank to turn the funds over to the receiver, and the appellant complied
with the ex parte order. Immediately thereafter, the appellant intervened
in the receivership proceedings, moving to vacate the ex parte order on the
theory that it was obtained in a prohibited summary proceeding without
notice and that, in any event, the appellant was entitled to the funds under
a previously exercised right to offset these funds against another debt. The
trial court denied the appellant's motion to vacate. The court of civil ap-
peals, however, reversed and held that the ex parte order should have been
vacated. In so ruling the court stated:
[A] receiver cannot through summary proceedings take into custody
property found in the possession of persons claiming adversely. The
receiver has no greater right than the person whose property he has
been appointed to receive, and if he desires to obtain possession of
property in the hands of a stranger to the suit, he must either make
that person a party or file a separate action against him.62
57. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 647.
58. 566 S.W.2d at 714. For a general discussion of legal principles governing the rela-
tionship between the adequacy of price and regularity of sales, see McKennon v. McGown,
II S.W. 532, 533 (Tex. 1889); Prudential Corp. v. Bazaman, 512 S.W.2d 85, 89-91 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
59. 566 S.W.2d at 713.
60. 555 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
61. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
62. 555 S.W.2d at 203. The case is complicated by the fact that all but $4,500 of the
funds that the bank turned over appear to have been delivered to a receiver in bankruptcy
appointed in a chapter XI proceeding involving one of the defendants in the state court
proceeding. The trial court had awarded the remaining $4,500 to the receiver appointed in
the state court receivership proceeding.
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In Bergeron v. Session6 3 the court of civil appeals determined that an
order awarding final compensation to a receiver and his accountant up to
the date of hearing was not interlocutory, but was an appealable final or-
der. In a subsequent opinion, the court held that the trial court erred in
making afinal award of the fees prior to the final accounting.64 The latter
opinion indicated that the appropriate procedure in cases of this type is to
allow a receiver a partial, nonfinal advance prior to a final accounting;
65
such an order will be considered interlocutory and, therefore, not appeala-
ble. Theoretically, this approach solves two problems. First, it avoids the
possibility of intermediate appeals. Secondly, it motivates the receiver to
terminate the receivership proceeding as early as possible. To further add
to this motivation, the court of civil appeals suggested that the partial ad-
vances should be materially less than the value of the services rendered by
the receiver prior to the allowance.66 In summary, the court held that a
final award of partial fees is appealable and constitutes an abuse of discre-
tion.
The court also considered in Bergeron the standards that a trial court
should apply in determining the amount of awards and advances to be
made. The court stated that compensation earned while acting in the ca-
pacity of a receiver must be determined separately from compensation for
legal work performed, if any, because a receiver is not entitled to be paid
at a legal rate for work that does not require legal skills.6 7 In addition, the
following were mentioned as controlling factors in ascertaining the value
of the services of a receiver: (1) the nature, extent, and value of the admin-
istered estate; (2) the complexity and difficulty of the work; (3) the time
spent; (4) the knowledge, experience, labor, and skill required of, or de-
voted by, the receiver; (5) the diligence and thoroughness displayed; and
(6) the results accomplished.68 Similar standards are also to be applied in
determining the reasonable value of the services of the attorney for the
receiver.69 Finally, the court held that there is no right to trial by jury on
the issue of the award of fees to the receiver.7°
The procedure for the appointment of a receiver was addressed in Rubin
v. Gilmore.7' A trial court had appointed a receiver to take charge of a
partnership business on the basis of findings that the partnership assets
were in danger of being appropriated by one of the partners for his per-
sonal use. The appellant contended that the order appointing the receiver
was unreasonably vague and was therefore invalid. The appellant also ar-
63. 554 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
64. Bergeron v. Sessions, 561 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (appellee's name was misspelled in the first opinion).
65. Id. at 553.
66. Id. at 553 n.I.
67. Id. at 554.
68. Id. at 554-55.
69. Id. See also State Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Professional Responsibility DR
2-106 (1971).
70. 561 S.W.2d at 554.
71. 561 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ).
19791
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JOURNAL
gued that the trial court lacked authority to appoint the receiver because
the applicant had not filed a bond as required by rule 695a.72 The court of
civil appeals concluded that the order involved was not so vague as to be
invalid; nevertheless, because the requirement of an applicant's bond is
mandatory, the court ruled that noncompliance with rule 695a required
reversal of the order of appointment.73
Parness v. Parness74 dealt with what constitutes appropriate conditions
for the appointment of a receiver. In Parness the court of civil appeals
reversed a trial court's order appointing a temporary receiver to take
charge of and sell the parties' homestead pending a divorce action. The
basis for the reversal was that a receiver should be appointed only in those
instances where the property involved is in present danger of being lost,
removed, or materially injured. Since there was no evidence of any such
imminent danger or urgency, the court ruled that it was error for the trial
court to appoint a receiver to sell the house.
In Hubbard P. Lagow" the Texas Supreme Court answered affirma-
tively the question whether a receiver appointed by a bankruptcy court in
a chapter XI proceeding had standing to seek a writ of error appeal from a
default judgment rendered against the debtor prior to the receiver's ap-
pointment. The rationale underlying the court's conclusion was that the
chapter XI receiver constitutes the legal representative of the debtor under
the terms of the Bankruptcy Act.7 6 The court also held, citing to rule 610
of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, that the petitioner, as a chapter XI
receiver, was not required to obtain bankruptcy court approval as a pre-
requisite to the prosecution of the writ of error appeal.77
II. SWORN ACCOUNTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
Several cases of major significance were decided during the survey pe-
riod with respect to sworn account practice pursuant to rule 185.78 In Jua-
rez v. Dunn7 9 the issue of the scope of rule 185 was considered in the
context of a claim for personal services rendered by an architect under the
terms of an express contract. The El Paso court of civil appeals held that
the literal language of the rule extending the procedural benefits of sworn
account practice beyond open accounts8" involving sales of personalty
72. TEX. R. Civ. P. 695a.
73. See Continental Homes Co. v. Hilitown Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 529 S.W.2d
293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
74. 560 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
75. 567 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978).
76. Id. at 492; see Smith v. Gerlach, 2 Tex. 424, 426 (1847), which states that a writ of
error "can only issue at the instance of a party to the suit, or of one whose privity of estate,
title, or interest appears from the record . . . or who may be the legal representative of such
party."
77. 567 S.W.2d at 493; see FED. BANKR. R. 610.
78. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
79. 567 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
80. An "open account" actually constitutes an implied in fact contract that arises from
the business dealings of the parties. For example, the price term is usually an "open" term.
See Tomasic & Kieval, Sworn Accounts and Summary Judgment Proceedings in Texas.- A
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should be given effect. Thus, pursuant to the holding in Juarez, sworn
account practice is not limited to "transactions between persons in which
there is a sale upon one side and a purchase upon the other, whereby title
to personal property passes from one to the other, and the relation of
debtor and creditor is thereby created by general course of dealing."',
With regard to the above, the statutory predecessor to rule 18582 was
amended in 1931 to extend the procedural benefits of sworn account prac-
tice to claims based upon accounts stated83 and to claims for personal serv-
ices rendered. 4 Subsequently, the rule was amended to add claims for
"labor done or labor or materials furnished."8" Despite these amend-
ments, the language quoted above from Meaders v. Biskam' 86 has been
relied upon for the proposition that sworn account practice encompasses
only sales of personalty on open account.87 Furthermore, Meaders fos-
tered another restriction on the scope of sworn account practice that is
usually described as the "special contract" doctrine, which is that a suit on
a sworn account is not based on "transactions between parties resting upon
special contract."88 A special contract has been defined as "one with pecu-
liar provisions or stipulations not found in the ordinary contract relating to
the same subject matter and such provisions are such as, if omitted from
the ordinary contract, the law will never supply."89 Claims for liquidated
money demands based upon written contracts that would be considered
special contracts are now clearly within the purview of rule 185.90 It is
therefore submitted that this obscure limitation should not be applied
when the transaction made the basis of the action is otherwise within the
literal purview of rule 185."' With regard to the scope of a permissible
claim for a liquidated money demand, it would appear that only those
types of claims actually enumerated in rule 185 are within its coverage.
Proposed Change, 17 So. TEX. L.J. 147, 151 (1976). A stated account arises when there is an
express agreement that the prices charged were usual, customary, and reasonable. See East-
ern Dev. & Inv. Corp. v. City of San Antonio, 557 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
81. Meaders v. Biskamp, 159 Tex. 79, 82-83, 316 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1958).
82. 1883 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 107, § I, at 110.
83. See Tomasic & Kieval, supra note 80, at 153. But see Unit, Inc. v. Ten Eyck-Shaw,
Inc., 524 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
84. 567 S.W.2d at 226.
85. See Tomasic & Kieval, supra note 80, at 150.
86. 159 Tex. 79, 316 S.W.2d 75 (1958).
87. See DeWees v. Alsip, 546 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ);
Robinson v. Faulkner, 422 S.W.2d 209, 212-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
88. Meaders v. Biskamp, 159 Tex. 79, 83, 316 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1958). Although the origin
of the special contract limitation is somewhat obscure, under the system of common law
pleading the term "special contract" was used to denote an express or explicit contract as
contrasted with a promise implied in law. H. BALLANTINE, SHIPMAN ON COMMON-LAW
PLEADING 148-52 (3d ed. 1923).
89. Eisenbeck v. Buttgen, 450 S.W.2d 696, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, no writ).
90. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
91. See Hollingsworth v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 522 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ) (rule 185 "does not apply to transactions between parties
resting upon special contracts other than those giving rise to the transactions mentioned in
the rule").
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Thus, the rule is probably unavailable except where the claim is for goods,
wares and merchandise, personal services rendered, labor done, or labor or
materials furnished.92 In Juarez the court also stated in the context of a
suit for personal services that in order to be entitled to the procedural ben-
efits of rule 185, the claimant
should swear to a systematic record of all charges and payments, en-
tered in regular sequence . . . that is, that a statement or invoice
[should] be set forth in the pleadings or by an attached and incorpo-
rated exhibit which clearly identifies the nature of the items constitut-
ing the sworn account, particularly where it is a suit for personal
services.93
In short, itemization is required in order to compel the opposing party to
plead more than a general denial.
Several other cases decided during the survey period, however, perpetu-
ate the notion that sworn account practice extends only to sales of person-
alty on open account. Suit was brought in Ferguson v. Yorfino94 to recover
overpayments allegedly made to a builder in connection with a written
construction contract. The court held that a suit to recover money ad-
vanced under a contract is not a suit on a sworn account. While the court's
holding is sensible insofar as this type of claim is not specifically set forth
in rule 185, the court's reliance upon Meaders v. Biskamp9 5 for a definition
of the scope of the rule is misleading. Similarly, in Dallas Eight, Ltd v.
Aaron Rents, Inc.9 6 a lessor brought suit based upon provisions contained
in the lease in the form of a sworn account for rental monies allegedly due
and for the value of some missing rented furniture. Because the support-
ing affidavits contained only conclusory statements, the court of civil ap-
peals reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the lessor. 97
In a statement unnecessary to the result reached, the court stated that a suit
on a sworn account must be based upon a transaction involving a sale on
one side and a purchase on the other whereby title to personalty passes
from one party to the other.98
The technical requirements imposed upon a party seeking to recover on
an account were considered in Minyard v. Southern Pipe & Supply Co.99
The defendant, who had failed to answer, attacked the default judgment
entered against him by writ of error. Since the affiant's name did not ap-
92. See Hollingsworth v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 522 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
93. 567 S.W.2d at 226.
94. 570 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
95. 159 Tex. 79, 316 S.W.2d 75 (1958). A careful reading of Meaders will indicate that
the definition of sworn account set forth in the opinion was in connection with a construc-
tion of the words "sworn account" contained in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226
(Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
96. 560 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
97. Id. at 780.
98. Id. at 779. See also Morgan v. Morgan, 406 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1966, no writ).
99. 563 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Rule 185 requires
that the claim be supported by an affidavit. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
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pear in the appropriate blank in the body of the affidavit, the defendant
contended that the affidavit supporting the account was fatally defective in
that it did not identify the signer of the affidavit as the person who ap-
peared before the notary public. The court held that since the affidavit had
been signed before a notary and contained a proper jurat, the omission was
a mere clerical error which did not invalidate the affidavit."° The defend-
ant also argued that the terminology in the invoices did not sufficiently
describe the goods sold to him, upon which the plaintiffs claim was based.
The court ruled, however, that the use of the terms "meter box," "gate
valve," and "closet flange" in the invoices was sufficient because the items
were described "in terms with recognized meanings in the English lan-
guage."'
0 '
Defendants continued to be plagued by technical pleading problems
during the survey period. In Airborne Freight Corp. v. CRB Marketing,
Inc.10 2 the supreme court summarized the effect of a sworn account peti-
tion in proper form as follows:
It is settled that if the defendant fails to file a written denial under
oath and in the form provided, he will not be permitted to dispute
receipt of the items or services or the correctness of the stated charges
... .The defendant may, however, assert defenses in the nature of
confession and avoidance without filing a sworn denial if they are
properly pleaded. . . Of course, a sworn account is not prima facie
evidence of the debt as against a stranger to the transaction.'
0 3
Because the defendant in Airborne had neither filed a sworn denial nor
pleaded an affirmative defense, the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff
was affirmed. "o Moreover, the supreme court held that it was not neces-
sary to introduce the account formally into evidence when the defendant
failed to plead a proper answer.
10 5
In Aztec Pope & Supply Co. v. Sundance Oil Co.' °6 the defendant's an-
swer contained the following allegations: (1) an assertion that "[tihe claim
on which plaintiffs claim is founded is wholly not just or true"; (2) a spe-
cific denial that the defendant requested the items involved; (3) a specific
denial that the defendant requested the items at the prices charged; and (4)
a specific denial that the defendant promised to pay for the materials.
Each of the specific denials contained the statement that "said allegation is
not just or true.' 07° The court of civil appeals held that the denials did not
meet the strict requirements of rule 185.1°8 Fortunately for the defendant,
100. 563 S.W.2d at 333.
101. Id.
102. 566 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. 1978).
103. Id. at 574 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
104. Id. at 574-75.
105. Id. at 575.
106. 568 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978), writ refd n.r.e. per
curiam, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 91 (Nov. 18, 1978).
107. 568 S.W.2d at 402.
108. "[Blefore an announcement of ready for trial in said cause, [the defendant must] file
a written denial, under oath, stating that each and every item is not just or true, or that some
specified item or items are not just or true ...." TEX. R. Civ. P. 185; see Cal-Tex Beef
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however, the court concluded that an affidavit filed by the defendant's
president raised an issue of fact with respect to whether the defendant was
a stranger to the account and was therefore not required to file a proper
answer.'' 9 In refusing the application for writ of error, the Supreme Court
of Texas wrote that the judgment of the lower court was correct because
the invoice, or "joint interest statement," included not only the name of the
defendant, but also the name of another company, thus raising a fact ques-
tion as to whether the defendant was a party to the transaction." 1
0
The stranger to the account exception was also considered in Juarez v.
Dunn."' While it is apparent that a stranger need not file a sworn denial
under rule 185, it is somewhat unclear who qualifies as a stranger and how
the matter should be raised. In Juarez the plaintiff alleged that one of the
defendants was a partner of the other defendant who had contracted with
the plaintiff, and by definition could not be a stranger to the transaction in
question. The noncontracting party filed a written denial of partnership
under oath." 2 The court of civil appeals held that this denial was suffi-
cient. In so doing, the court observed that prior case law seems to limit the
stranger to the account exception to those situations in which the plaintiffs
own pleadings or the exhibits reflected that the defendant was not a party
to the original transaction.' '3 It now appears that it is possible to raise the
"defense" by either a sworn denial under Rule 93 or perhaps as an "affirm-
ative defense" to the special pleading requirements. If the latter character-
ization of the "defense" is accepted, summary judgment proof must be
produced by the nonmovant. 114
Several cases decided during the survey period addressed the recovery
of attorneys' fees in the context of sworn account practice. In Harvey v.
Pedigo Oil Co."' the presentment requirement of article 2226,' 16 the pro-
Processors, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1975, no writ) (the defendant's answer, accompanied by the proper affidavit, stated that
"[tihe claim alleged in Plaintiffs petition which is the foundation of Plaintiff's action is
wholly not Just or true" and was considered sufficient).
109. 56g S.W.2d at 403-04.
110. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 91 (Nov. 18, 1978).
111. 567 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ refd n.r.e.). For an additional
discussion of this case, see notes 79-93 supra.
112. TEx. R. Civ. P. 93(0. See also Booher v. Criswell, 531 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
113. 567 S.W.2d at 227; see Boysen v. Security Lumber Co., 531 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ).
14. See Brown v. Clark, 557 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no
writ). See also Airborne Freight v. CRB Marketing, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. 1978),
wherein the defendant alleged that it had no record of contracting for the services and this
was considered insufficient. See also Aztec Pipe & Supply Co. v. Sundance Oil Co., 568
S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, writ rerd n.r.e.); Brown v.
Clark, 557 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ).
115. 557 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
116. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides in part as
follows:
Any person, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity having a valid
claim against a person or corporation for services rendered, labor done, mate-
rial furnished, overcharges on freight or express, lost or damaged freight or
express, or stock killed or injured or suits founded upon a sworn account or
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vision governing the award of attorneys' fees, was considered. The re-
quirement was held to be satisfied when the claimant's lawyer went to see
the defendant to talk to her about the account involved in the action, but
was threatened with a whipping and told to contact the defendant's attor-
ney before suit was filed. Enriquez v. K&D Development & Construction,
Inc.117 is of more significance for its statement that it is no longer neces-
sary for the claimant to "finally obtain judgment" in order to recover attor-
ney's fees pursuant to article 2226.8 Prior to its amendment, the statute
contained language to the effect that a judgment for all or part of the claim
as presented was necessary." 9 This language was excised, however, by the
Sixty-fifth Legislature. The court of civil appeals noted that attorneys' fees
are now recoverable "if at the expiration of thirty days after presentment
of the claim 'payment for the just amount owing has not been ten-
dered.' ,120 The El Paso court also indicated that there was no require-
ment that the plaintiff accept a tender of payment before judgment, which
had been true even prior to the amendment.' 2 '
By its decision in Welborn v. Woolfolk,' 22 the Fort Worth court of civil
appeals appears to have eliminated the "special contract" limitation on the
recoverability of attorney's fees.' 23 Plaintiff had provided labor and
materials to the defendant at the defendant's request. When the defendant
failed to pay, suit was instituted on an implied in fact contract theory. In
addition, attorney's fees were sought pursuant to article 2226. The trial
court denied the plaintiff recovery of attorney's fees on the theory of "spe-
cial contract." In ruling otherwise, the court of civil appeals concluded
that the special contract doctrine is at variance with the liberal construc-
tion provision of the civil statutes.'24 The court also concluded that the
1977 amendment to article 2226, which permits "suits founded on oral or
written contracts," demonstrates that the special contract doctrine is not
valid. 1
25
Several courts of civil appeals have held that the "special contract" doc-
accounts, or suits founded on oral or written contracts, may present the same
to such persons or corporation or to any duly authorized agent thereof; and if,
at the expiration of 30 days thereafter, payment for the just amount owing has
not been tendered, the claimant may, if represented by an attorney, also re-
cover, in addition to his claim and costs, a reasonable amount as attorney's
fees.
117. 567 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
118. Id. at 42.
119. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon 1971).
120. 567 S.W.2d at 42.
121. Id.
122. 560 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
123. See note 89 supra and accompanying text for definition of "special contract."
124. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 10, § 8 (Vernon 1969), which provides:
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof shall be
strictly construed shall have no application to the Revised Statutes; but the
said statutes shall constitute the law of this State respecting the subjects to
which they relate; and the provisions thereof shall be liberally construed with
a view to effect their objects and to promote justice.
125. 560 S.W.2d at 191.
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trine serves only as a limitation on the language of article 2226, which
allows the recovery of attorney's fees in connection with suits founded
upon a sworn account or accounts. 126 The supreme court has held that the
term "sworn account" in article 2226 is restricted to transactions involving
sales of personalty on open account. ' 27 While the "special contract" limi-
tation can be justified as a limitation on the recovery of attorneys' fees
when the only basis for recovery is the sworn account category in article
2226, there is no compelling precedential basis for extending the limitation
to other categories in the section, such as claims for services rendered, la-
bor done, or material furnished. A policy argument can be made that
when parties make an express contract having no open terms, it is inappro-
priate to imply a provision for the recovery of attorneys' fees upon non-
payment. This argument rests on the notion that the expectation of the
breaching party is that a breach will result in liability on the contract and
nothing more. On the other hand, article 2226 evidences a policy that at-
torneys' fees of a reasonable amount should be awarded to compensate a
creditor who has presented a valid claim within the statute to the alleged
debtor. This policy has little or nothing to do with the original expecta-
tions of the contracting parties. Hence, the "special contracts" limitation
should be abandoned.
III. USURY
A. Guarant /Suretyshiv Obligations
Two cases decided during the survey period clarified the application of
the Texas usury laws to corporations. In Houston Furniture Distributors,
Inc. v. Bank of Woodlake, NA. '28 an individual serving as guarantor of a
corporate obligation that was not usurious as to the corporation 29 at-
tempted to assert usury as a defense to a suit on a note on the theory that
the use of the corporate form was merely a subterfuge to evade the usury
laws, and that he was the "true" borrower.' 3 ° As support for this theory,
the guarantor relied upon general language in Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka Life
Insurance Co. of America,'3' which suggests that if the loan was actually
made to the guarantor, and that if the language of the loan documents is in
126. See, e.g., Jackson v. Paulsel Lumber Co., 461 S.W.2d 161, 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1970, writ refd n.r.e.).
127. Meaders v. Biskamp, 159 Tex. 79, 82-83, 316 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1958); see note 81 supra
and accompanying text.
128. 562 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, no writ).
129. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
130. The claim or defense of usury is not available to a corporate guarantor unless the
corporate rate is exceeded. Universal Metals & Mach., Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874, 879
(Tex. 1976); Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1975, no writ).
131. 534 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e). See also
Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no
writ) ("While it is true that the corporate entity may be disregarded where it is used as a
cloak or cover for fraud or some other transaction tainted with illegality, such is not the
situation").
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fact fictional, the lower individual rate should apply. 132 The court of civil
appeals held that since the guarantor had demonstrated only that the
lender had suggested the use of a corporation, the evidence was not suffi-
cient to show that the loan transaction was a subterfuge to avoid the appli-
cation of the usury statute. 33 In Gu/f Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v.
Price134 a lender contended that a guarantor of a corporate obligation had
no cause of action for usury even if the statutory corporate rate of interest
was exceeded. 35 The court of civil appeals disagreed, and held that if
interest is charged in excess of the maximum allowable corporate rate, a
guarantor does have a cause of action.
136
B. "Charging" Cases
In Killebrew v. Bartlett '3 the plaintiff instituted a suit based on a sworn
account. At the bottom of the invoices that supported the account was the
following notice: "1 1/2% Charged Each Month on Your Unpaid Balance
30 Days After Purchase, 50¢ Minimum Charge."'' 38 In his original peti-
tion, the plaintiff claimed interest at one and one half percent each month
on the balance of the account, although this claim was subsequently omit-
ted from his amended petition. The evidence at trial reflected that "no
amount for interest was ever added to the bills sent to the defendants and
that no interest was charged to the defendants' account on the books of the
company."' 39 The jury found that plaintiff had not charged interest in
excess of ten percent per annum. On appeal the legal and factual suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the jury's answer was challenged by the
appellant. In straining to distinguish the Texas Supreme Court's holding
in Windhorst v. Adcock Pipe & Supply Co., that a "contract for, a charge of
or receipt of usurious interest" triggers the usury penalties, 4 ° the Amarillo
132. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971) provides: "Except as
otherwise fixed by law, the maximum rate of interest shall be ten percent per annum. A
greater rate of interest than ten percent per annum unless otherwise authorized by law shall
be deemed usurious."
133. 562 S.W.2d at 883. As a condition to making a loan, a lender can lawfully require
that the loan be made to a corporate as opposed to an individual borrower; here, however,
"the burden was on the defendants to offer competent summary judgment proof of some
agreement, device or subterfuge to charge interest at a usurious rate." Id.
134. 566 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
135. Id. at 384. The lender relied upon Micrea v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 534 S.W.2d 348,
354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ refd n.r.e.), which contains the suggestion that
"[r]ights of redress ... are ... restricted to those who are original parties to the usurious
contract."
136. 566 S.W.2d at 384.
137. 568 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ),
138. Id. at 917.
139. Id.
140. 547 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1977). In Windhorst the court of civil appeals had held
that the charging of interest in excess of the amount authorized by statute would not support
the claim or defense of usury unless the interest was charged pursuant to an agreement. The
supreme court concluded that the holding of the court of civil appeals was contrary to the
plain meaning of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971), which pro-
vides that "[a]ny person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater than
the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor twice the amount of inter-
est contracted for, charged or received and reasonable attorney's fees." 547 S.W.2d at 261.
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court held that since no amount of interest was actually added to the ac-
count, and since the evidence did not show any demand for payment,' 4 '
Windhorst was inapplicable.1
42
The claimant seeking to recover on a sworn account did not fare as well
in Heaner v. Houston Sash & Door Co. 4 3 The appellee provided goods
and services to a corporation on an open account that was guaranteed by
the appellant's husband prior to his death. Upon nonpayment, the appel-
lee brought suit against both the corporation and the appellant in the ca-
pacity of executrix of the guarantor's estate. The appellant filed a sworn
denial and counterclaimed for the penalties provided by article 5069-1.06
on the basis that the appellee had "charged" interest on the unpaid ac-
count balance at the rate of twelve percent beginning thirty days after the
delivery of the merchandise.' 4 Because no agreement was pleaded or
proved concerning the interest charged, the court of civil appeals con-
cluded that the Consumer Credit Code mandated a six percent interest rate
applicable from the first day of January after the making of the account. '
45
The "charge" of twelve percent therefore constituted a charge of double
the amount of interest allowable under Texas law. This subjected the
lender to a forfeiture of an amount equal to twice the amount of interest
charged,'" a forfeiture of all principal, 47 and liability for attorneys' fees.
The portion of the court of civil appeals judgment pertaining to He-
aner's estate was reversed by the supreme court.148 Mr. Heaner, chairman
of the board of the corporation, had executed a separate letter agreement
guaranteeing the corporation's account. The letter agreement further pro-
vided that Heaner would pay" 'interest from the due date of any [corpora-
tion] account to the date of payment at the rate of 12% per annum.' ,,49
The supreme court concluded that since Heaner was an obligor only under
his written guaranty, "not a co-obligor on the open account,"' 5 ° his estate
was not entitled to interpose the corporation's usury defense. The supreme
141. The original petition was never introduced at trial.
142. 568 S.W.2d at 917; accord, Thomas Conveyor Co. v. Portec, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 361
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
143. 560 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ), a 'din part, rev'd in part, 22
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 206 (Jan. 31, 
1979).
144. 560 S.W.2d at 526. Compare the method of computation of interest used by the
majority and dissenting judges in Watson v. Cargill, Inc., Nutrena Div., 573 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
145. 560 S.W.2d at 527. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971) pro-
vides: "When no specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties, interest at the rate of
six percent per annum shall be allowed on . . . all open accounts, from the first day of
January after the same are made."
146. See note 140 supra.
147. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(2) (Vernon 1971) provides in part: "Any
person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is in excess of double the
amount of interest allowed by this Subtitle shall forfeit as an additional penalty, all principal
as well as interest and all other charges and shall pay reasonable attorney fees set by the
court. .. "
148. Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 206 (Jan. 31, 1979).
149. Id. at 207.
150. Id. at 209.
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court further held that the interest rate specified in article 5069-1.04,''
which provides that the parties to a written contract may agree to a maxi-
mum rate of interest of ten percent per annum, applied to the guaranty
agreement, rather than the six percent per annum rate, which constitutes
the rate of interest that may be charged to an obligor on an open account.
Since the guaranty provided for interest at a rate of twelve percent per
annum, however, the ten percent rate was exceeded and Houston Sash &
Door was subject to a forfeiture of an amount equal to twice the amount of
interest contracted for and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to article
5069-1.06(1).' 52 Heaner's estate is theoretically entitled to recover any
amounts that it is required to pay Houston Sash & Door from the corpora-
tion accomodated by the guaranty.
The supreme court's opinion in Heaner is also noteworthy because of
the method seemingly employed to determine whether an amount in ex-
cess of double the amount allowed by article 5069-1.03153 has been
charged by the account creditor. For example, the opinion contains the
following paragraph:
It is undisputed that Houston Sash charged interest on Bedford's
account during the calendar year in which it was made. It is also
apparent that the interest charged (twelve percent) is in excess of
double the amount allowed by Article 5069-1.03; i.e., in excess of
twice zero. Houston Sash is, therefore, subject to the penalty forfei-
ture prescribed by Article 5069-1.06(2). 
154
Under this method of analysis, it appears that anytime an account creditor
charges any amount of interest attributable to the calendar year in which
the account was made, the penalty provisions of article 5069-1.06(2) are
applicable. 1
55
In Miles v. WC Roberts Lumber Co.,'5 6 a case decided prior to the
supreme court's opinion in Heaner, an intermediate result was reached in-
volving an action by the appellee on an open account. Since the appellant
failed to prove that no agreement had been made with respect to a speci-
fied rate of interest on the account, the six percent rate implied by law in
the absence of such agreement was inapplicable. 57 Thus, proof that the
seller-appellee had assessed "service charges" of one percent per month on
151. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon 1971).
152. Id. art. 5069-1.06(l).
153. Id. art. 5069-1.03.
154. 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 209.
155. Assume that XYZ, Inc. purchases goods or services from ABC, Inc. such that the
account between the purchaser and the seller is made on December 30, 1979. Assume that
the first invoice sent by the seller to the purchaser "charges" interest on the unpaid balance
at the rate of one percent per annum. Under the supreme court's reasoning has the seller
forfeited the entirevrincipal by charging interest on the account during the calendar year in
which it was made. It is submitted that it will be more sensible to treat both the portion of
the calendar year in which the account was made and during which interest was charged and
the subsequent or successive calendar year as the period during which the per annum inter-
est rate would be computed.
156. 561 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
157. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
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the past due balance' was insufficient to show that the interest was in
excess of double the allowable amount, as the appellant had failed to
prove that six percent was the allowable amount. It should be observed
that if the charge had exceeded twice the allowable amount, the lender
would have been required to forfeit all principal, as was the case in He-
aner. The court reasoned that because interest not in excess of ten percent
per annum is authorized if agreed upon,'59 the borrower must prove that
the interest was not charged pursuant to an agreement. The supreme
court's opinion in Heaner casts doubt upon this conclusion. 60 Neverthe-
less, since the twelve percent per annum charge exceeded the ten percent
maximum rate, the court imposed a penalty of double the amount of inter-
est charged. 16'
C. Miscellaneous
Venue. Article 5069-1.06(3) of the Texas Consumer Credit Act provides
the following with regard to actions brought for statutory penalties pursu-
ant to article 5069-1.06(1) and (2):
[Such actions] shall be brought . . . in the county of the defendant's
residence, or in the county where the interest in excess of the amount
authorized by this Subtitle has been received or collected, or where
such transaction had been entered into or where the parties who paid
the interest in excess of the amount authorized by this Subtitle resided
when such transaction occurred, or where he resides.'
6 2
In Allied Finance Co. v. Miro16 3 the cryptic words "or where he resides"
were construed to mean where the plaintiff resides at the time of suit.
Moreover, the court of civil appeals held that proof of usury is not re-
quired to establish proper venue when plaintiff relies for venue on the
words "or where he resides."'
164
Required Balances with Third Parties. In Texas International Mortgage Co.
v. MP. Crum Co.' 65 a lender required the borrower to deposit a portion of
the loan proceeds with a third party. Apparently, the deposit with the
third party resulted in the issuance of a certificate of deposit that was given
to the lender as collateral. The Dallas court of civil appeals concluded that
this circuitous operation was not of the type in which "the lender required
the borrower to keep part of the loan proceeds on deposit with the lender,
thus permitting the lender to use it in making loans to others. Here the
only benefit to the lender from the $100,000 deposit was as security for the
158. 561 S.W.2d at 258.
159. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (Vernon 1971).
160. The supreme court's opinion quotes a portion of the Waco civil appeals decision
that indicates that the burden of producing evidence of an "agreement" is on the creditor:
"The court of civil appeals stated: 'There was no agreement plead or proved by plaintiff
whereby Bedford wouldpay a rate of interest on its open account with Houston Sash in
excess of 6%.' 560 S.W.2d 525 at 526." 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 207 n.6.
161. 561 S.W.2d at 259; see note 140 supra.
162. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1971).
163. 568 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
164. Id. at 911.
165. 564 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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loan . "...'166 Hence, the court held that the true principal was not re-
duced by the amount deposited with the third party in testing for usury.1
67
IV. CONSUMER CREDIT
The provisions of the Texas Consumer Credit Code were again the sub-
ject of litigation during the survey period. Chapter 7 of the Texas Con-
sumer Credit Code, which relates to motor vehicle installment sales,
regulates retail installment transactions between "retail buyers" and "retail
sellers" of "motor vehicles." The statute defines the term "retail buyer" as
"a person who agrees to buy or buys a motor vehicle other than principally
for the purpose of resale, from a retail seller in a retail installment transac-
tion." 6 Thus, the fact that the motor vehicle is not purchased primarily
for personal, family, or household use is not determinative.' 69 Despite this
broad language, the court in Hensley v. Lubbock National Bank 171 con-
cluded that the appellant's purchase of a motor vehicle from the appellee's
assignor, for the purpose of helping out a third party and business associ-
ate, constituted a purchase that was principally for resale and the appellant
was therefore not a "retail buyer." The court also overruled the appel-
lant's contention that he was protected by the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act.' 7 ' Because the appellant had purchased the motor vehicle
for the purpose of "helping a friend," he was held not to be a "consumer"
as defined in the federal act.' 7 2 Hence, the transaction did not qualify as a
federal consumer credit transaction. 
73
In Mobile America Sales Corp. v. Rivers 74 the trial court concluded that
the defendants improperly failed to disclose that the physical damage in-
surance required by a retail installment contract executed in connection
166. Id. at 422. For an example of the kind of case distinguished by the court, see First
State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1977).
167. 564 S.W.2d at 422; see First State Bank v. Miller, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978); Tan-
ner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977); Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102
S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
168. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.01(b) (Vernon 1971); see Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Blocker, 558 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
169. See generally TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-
79) (retail installment sales). See also id. art. 5069-14.01(8).
170. 561 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976).
172. 561 S.W.2d at 890. The federal act provides as follows:
The adjective "consumer," used with reference to a credit transaction, charac-
terizes the transaction as one in which the party to whom credit is offered or
extended is a natural person, and the money, property, or services which are
the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes.
15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1976).
173. Seealso TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-14.01(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79),
defining "consumer" as
a person as defined by [art. 5069-1.01(e)], and the money, property, or serv-
ices which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family,
household, or agricultural purposes or are business or commercial transactions
subject to the provisions of [arts. 5069-3.01 to -5.05, -7.01 to 7.10, -12.02
to -12.20].
174. 556 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
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with the purchase of a mobile home was at a rate or premium not fixed or
approved by the State Board of Insurance. 175 As a result, the court
awarded penal damages in an amount of twice the time price differen-
tial, "'76 default and deferment charges in the sum of $27,218.52, and rea-
sonable attorneys' fees.' Appellees contended that the statutory
requirement of disclosure when the rate is not "fixed or approved" is unen-
forceable because of its uncertain meaning. They also argued that since
the insurer's by-laws had been filed with the State Board of Insurance and
had contained the rates or charges of the insurer, the rates had in fact been
"fixed or approved." The court of civil appeals disagreed with both con-
tentions and affirmed the award by the trial court of a partial summary
judgment.
78
In Smail v. Sequoya Mobile Homes, Inc.'179 the appellants contended
that the seller of a mobile home and its assignee violated both chapter 7 of
the Texas Consumer Credit Code and regulation Z,' 8° promulgated under
section 128(b) of the Federal Truth in Lending Act.' 8 ' With regard to the
state law allegations, the appellants argued that the retail installment con-
tract entered into by them violated articles 5069-7.02(6)(b),' 82 5069-
7.02(3),83 and 5069-7.06(3). 84 Although the retail installment contract
recited a cash down payment in excess of the actual down payment, the
court concluded there was no violation of article 5069-7.02(6)(b) because
the purpose of the incorrect disclosure in this instance was to facilitate
financing for the transaction. The court noted that the buyers had partici-
pated in the making of the incorrect recital for their own benefit and were
175. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.06(3) (Vernon 1971) provides:
[W)hen any requested or required insurance is sold or procured by the seller
or holder at a premium or rate of charge not fixed or approved by the State
Board of Insurance, the seller or holder shall include such fact [in a disclosure
statement] .... Such statement or statements may be made in conjunction
with or as a part of the retail installment contract ....
176. The penalty provision relied upon by the court was id. art. 5069-8.01(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1978-79).
177. 556 S.W.2d at 380. Article 5069-8.01(b) was amended by the 65th Legislature to
limit the penalties for violations of the disclosure requirements of subtitle two for transac-
tions entered into after June 30, 1976, to an amount not to exceed $4,000 in a transaction in
which the amount financed is in excess of $5,000. The transaction in question occurred in
1974.
178. 556 S.W.2d at 381-82.
179. 568 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978), rep'd, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 319
(Apr. 25, 1979).
180. 12 C.F.R. § 226.801(b) (1978).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b) (1976).
182. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.02(6) (Vernon 1971) provides: "The retail
installment contract shall specifically set out the following items:. . .(b) The amount of the
buyer's down payment, if any, specifying the amounts paid in money and in goods traded in
183. Id. art. 5069-7.02(3) provides: "A retail installment contract shall also contain, in a
size equal to at least ten-point bold type, a specific statement that liability insurance cover-
age for bodily injury and property damage caused to others is not included, if that is the
case."
184. Id. art. 5069-7.06(3) provides that when insurance is required in connection with a
contract or agreement, that requirement must be disclosed "clearly and conspicuously."
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not harmed by the transaction. 85 In addition, the court held that the con-
tract's disclosure that liability insurance coverage was not included was
sufficient on its face, 186 as was the disclosure pertaining to required insur-
ance."'87 The appellants contended that the retail installment contract vio-
lated federal law' 88 since the buyer's signature was not below the full
content of the document, and the agreement did not state on both sides
thereof the wording: "NOTICE: See other side for important informa-
tion."' 89 The court of civil appeals held that the contract violated section
226.801.19 1 Hence, recovery of $1,000 plus interest was held appropri-
ate. 9"' The supreme court reversed the holding of the court of civil appeals
because the section applies only to documents processed by mechanical
and electronic equipment. Moreover, the court pointed out that section
226.801 is not a "regulation," but only a Federal Reserve Board interpreta-
tion of regulation Z.
In Garza v. Allied Finance Co.'9 2 the appellee finance company insti-
tuted suit on an installment note secured by the appellants' household
goods. The appellants claimed that the appellee had violated the regula-
tion Z requirement that provides for the identification of the property to
which a security interest relates:
[Regulation Z requires] a clear identification of the property to which
the security interest relates or, if. . .not identifiable, an explanation
of the manner in which the creditor retains or may acquire a security
interest in such property which the creditor is unable to identify ....
If after-acquired property will be subject to the security interest...
this fact shall be clearly set forth in conjunction with the description
or identification of the type of security interest held, retained or ac-
185. 568 S.W.2d at 389.
186. With regard to this point, the court stated:
The contract states in bold type that "liability insurance for bodily injury and
propertydamage to others is not included unless such coverage is a part of a
mobile homeowners policy purchased hereunder." The contract conclusively
shows on its face that a "mobile homeowners policy" was not purchased under
the agreement.
Id. at 390.
187. Id. at 389.
188. 12 C.F.R. § 226.801(b) (1978) provides in part:
[Tlhe disclosures required under § 226.8 shall ... be made on the face of that
document, on its reverse side, or on both sides: Provided, that the amount of
the finance charge and the annual percentage rate shall appear on the face of
the document, and, if the reverse side is used, the printing on both sides of the
document shall be equally clear and conspicuous, both sides shall contain the
statement, "NOTICE: See other side for important information," and the
place for the customer's signature shall be provided following the full content
of the document.
189. 568 S.W.2d at 388. See also McDonald v. Savoy, 501 S.W.2d 400, 406 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ).
I90. 568 S.W.2d at 391.
191. Id. at 390; see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976). Similarly, in Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Blocker, 558 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ), a creditor's failure to use
the required term "total of payments" in connection with the disclosure of the sum of pay-
ments was held to be in violation of§ 226.8(b)(3). See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.8(b)(3), .807(b)(1)
(1978).
192. 566 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
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quired. 1
93
The disclosure statement provided to the appellants identified the collat-
eral as "household goods" and indicated that after-acquired household
goods were included. The statement did not disclose, however, that the
security interest under an after-acquired property clause did not attach to
consumer goods "unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days
after the secured party gives value."' 94 The Corpus Christi court of civil
appeals held that the failure to make this disclosure constituted a truth-in-
lending violation. Moreover, the disclosures were held not to be "in con-
junction with" each other since the after-acquired property disclosure was
located at the bottom of the disclosure statement, while the description of
the collateral was at the top.' 95
Perhaps of more significance in Garza is the court's holding that the
appellants' claim was not barred by the one year statute of limitations con-
tained in the federal act.' 96 The claim was asserted defensively after the
time had passed for bringing an original action. 197 Relying upon cases
from other jurisdictions and an early Texas case that appears to hold just
the opposite, 98 the court of civil appeals held that since the defendants'
claim involved the same transaction that resulted in the note sued upon,
the claim could be asserted defensively as recoupment.' 99
In Crowder v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association2 °° the secondary
mortgage provisions of the Texas Consumer Credit Code were construed
to authorize a provision in a note and secondary mortgage contract for a
fifteen percent attorneys' fee in the event of default, despite specific statu-
tory language prohibiting "'all charges whatsoever' in connection with the
collecting or enforcing of a loan, except those few which are expressly per-
mitted." '' The appellants had executed two notes secured by secondary
mortgages on their homestead to finance the construction of a swimming
193. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1978).
194. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.204(d)(2) (Vernon 1968).
195. 566 S.W.2d at 65.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1976) provides: "Any action under this section may be brought
in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within
one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation."
197. 566 S.W.2d at 62.
198. United States v. Western Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Bull v. United States, 295
U.S. 247 (1935); Moriss-Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 91 S.W.2d 313 (1936).
199. 566 S.W.2d at 63. The court further stated that "f[the defense of recoupment may
be asserted even though the same claim asserted as an independent cause of action would be
barred by limitations." Id See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539c (Vernon Supp.
1978-79), which provides:
In the event a pleading asserting a cause of action is filed under circum-
stances where at the date when answer thereto is required by law a counter-
claim or cross claim would otherwise be barred by the applicable statute of
limitation, then the party so answering may, within 30 days following such
answer date file a counterclaim or cross claim in such cause and the period of
limitation is hereby extended for such period of time provided that the coun-
terclaim or cross claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
200. 567 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. Id. at 552.
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pool and a tennis court. Although not in default, the appellants instituted
a suit against the appellee for statutory penalties alleging that the "attor-
ney's fees upon default" provisions contained in the instruments were vio-
lative of article 5069-5.02(5).202 The court interpreted the statutory
section as not specifically prohibiting contractual provisions pertaining to
attorneys' fees in the event of default. 2°3 The court of civil appeals con-
cluded that "[ilt is inconceivable that . . . the contracting for attorney's
fees in the event of default amounted to a deceptive or abusive practice,
when such practice has never been considered deceptive or abusive or po-
tentially usurious by the courts.
In Anguiano v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. 20 5 the appellants entered into a
contract with a builder for the construction of a new house on a lot owned
by appellants. The builder agreed to construct the dwelling for a cash
price of $13,910 plus a "time price differential '2 6 of $15,124, for a total of
$29,034. The question presented was whether chapter 6 of the Texas Con-
sumer Credit Code, by its terms applicable to retail installment transac-
tions, also applies to installment credit contracts for the construction of a
new home. The definition in Texas of a retail installment transaction is as
follows:
[Any transaction in which a retail buyer purchases goods or services
from a retail seller pursuant to a retail installment contract or a retail
charge agreement . . . which provides for a time price differential
. . . and under which the buyer agrees to pay the unpaid balance in
one or more installments, together with a time price differential. 207
Thus, whether a new house constituted a good or not was determinative.
According to chapter 6, the word "goods" includes
all tangible personal property when purchased primarily for personal,
family or household use and not for commercial or business use, in-
cluding such property which is furnished or used at the time of sale or
subsequently, in the modernization, rehabilitation, repair, alteration,
improvement or construction of real property so as to become a part
202. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-5.02(5) (Vernon 1971) provides:
In addition to the authorized charges provided in this Chapter no further or
other charge[s] or amount whatsoever shall be directly, or indirectly, charged,
contracted for, or received. This includes (but is not limited by) all charges
such as fees, compensation, bonuses, commissions, brokerage, discounts, ex-
penses and every other charge of any nature whatsoever, whether of the types
listed herein or not. Without limitation of the foregoing, such charges may be
any form of costs or compensation whether contracted for or not, received by
the lender, or any other person, in connection with (a) the investigating, ar-
ranging, negotiation, procuring, guaranteeing, making, servicing, collecting or
enforcing of a loan ....
203. 567 S.W.2d at 552.
204. Id. at 554.
205. 561 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
206. Under the time price differential doctrine, Texas courts have not treated the differ-
ence between a cash price and a credit price as "interest," even when the credit price is or
exceeds the cash price plus lawful interest. See Lamb v. Ed Maker, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 255
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no writ).
207. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069--6.01(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (emphasis
added).
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thereof whether or not severable therefrom.2" 8
The court of civil appeals held that chapter 6 applies "to the initial erection
of structures as well as [work done on] pre-existing structures. "209 Hence,
the contract was required to be in conformity with the remaining statutory
provisions of chapter 6 in order for the builder to avoid the statutory pen-
alties.
2 10
Prior to its amendment by the Sixty-fifth Legislature, article 5069-
6.05211 contained a prohibition upon the granting of a first lien upon real
estate to secure a contractual monetary obligation, except when such a lien
was created by the recording of an abstract of judgment. Since the con-
tract under consideration in Anguiano granted appellee a first lien, appel-
lee was held subject to the statutory penalty of twice the amount of time
price differential contracted for, or $30,248. The Sixty-fifth Legislature
amended article 5069-6.05 to permit the acquisition of a first lien so long
as the time price differential does not exceed an annual percentage rate of
ten percent.23 2
The venue provision contained in subtitle two of the Texas Consumer
Credit Code, in effect prior to its amendment by the Sixty-fifth Legislature,
was construed in Velasquez v. Schuehle.2 13 Analyzing the language of arti-
cle 5069-8.0424 as it read prior to its amendment by the Sixty-fifth Legis-
lature, the court of civil appeals concluded that venue was proper in the
county where the action was filed because the plaintiff resided in Bexar
County, the county of suit,2I5 and because the transaction was entered into
208. Id. art. 5069-6.01(a) (emphasis added).
209. 561 S.W.2d at 253.
210. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-8.01-.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
211. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 274, § 2, at 646.
212. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069--6.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) states:
No retail installment contract or retail charge agreement shall:
(7) Provide for or grant a first lien upon real estate to secure such obligation,
except, ...
(b) such lien as is provided for or granted by a contract or series of contracts
for the sale or construction and sale of a structure to be used as a residence so
long as the time price differential does not exceed an annual percentage rate of
10 percent.
213. 562 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ).
214. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.04 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides: "Ac-
tions under this Chapter may be brought in the county where the transaction was entered
into or where the Defendant resides at the time the action was filed ..... Prior to its
amendment by the 65th Legislature the section provided:
All such actions ... shall be brought ... in the county of defendant's resi-
dence, or in the county where the interest, time price differential or other
charge in excess of the amount authorized by this Subtitle shall have been
received or collected, or where such transaction has been entered into or
where the parties who paid the interest, time price differential or other charge
in excess of the amount authorized in this Subtitle resided when such transac-
tion occurred, or where he resides.
id. art. 5069-8.04 (Vernon 1971). Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(3)
(Vernon 1971).
215. 562 S.W.2d at 3; cf. Donald v. Agricultural Livestock Fin. Corp., 495 S.W.2d 592
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ) (proof of party's residence in county at time of
suit established venue).
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in that county.21 6 It is currently uncertain whether proof of a cause of
action will be required under the amended statute to sustain venue "where
the transaction was entered into" under amended article 5069-8.04.
V. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES. ACT
In Spradling v. Williams2"7 the Texas Supreme Court considered the
method of special issue submission in an action brought under the Decep-
tive Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).21 8 The plaintiff-
appellee alleged that the appellant had made deceptive representations
about a pleasure boat that he sold the appellee. The issues submitted in
the trial court were: (1) whether a particular representation had been
made; (2) whether the representation constituted a deceptive trade prac-
tice; and (3) whether the representation was relied upon. The court de-
fined a deceptive trade practice as one "which has the capacity to deceive
an average or ordinary person, even though that person may have been
ignorant, unthinking or credulous., 219 Appellant contended that this in-
struction was erroneous insofar as it reduced the plaintiffs burden of
proof. The supreme court, however, held that the definition was proper.
Subsection 17.46(c) 220 provides that Texas courts are to be guided by the
interpretations given by the federal courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.22' The supreme court concluded that the defini-
tion given by the trial court had been approved by the federal courts.
222
The appellant also complained that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury "that the term 'false, misleading, or deceptive' acts or practices
includes, but is not limited to the following acts," 223 and then listing the
five acts allegedly committed by the defendant. The supreme court held
that the instruction was erroneous because if subsection 17.46(b), which
contains a non-exclusive "laundry list" of specific legislatively defined de-
ceptive trade practices, declares a practice to be unlawful, "there is no need
216. 562 S.W.2d at 3. Apparently, the court of civil appeals held that since the nature of
plaintiff's cause of action was noncompliance with the disclosure requirements, proof that
the retail installment contract was not completed so as to make the disclosures constituted
proof of a cause of action. There is, however, a suggestion in the opinion that proof of a
cause of action is not necessary when the venue exception relied upon is "where such trans-
action was entered into." Cf. National Mortgage Corp. of America v. Maxwell, 541 S.W.2d
626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ) (plaintiffs were not residents of the county in
which suit was filed; the court held that proof that the transaction was usurious was neces-
sary to maintain venue).
217. 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978).
218. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79). Originally
passed in 1973, the DTPA was amended in 1976 and 1977.
219. 566 S.W.2d at 562.
220. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). The 65th Legislature amended § 17.46(c) in 1977 to
provide that in private damage actions, the courts should look to interpretations of only the
federal courts; prior to the amendment courts were directed to be guided by the interpreta-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission as well.
222. 566 S.W.2d at 563. See Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F.73, 75 (2d Cir.
1910). But see Lynn, Anatomy ofa Deceptive Trade Practices Case, 31 Sw. L.J. 867, 869-74
(1977).
223. 566 S.W.2d at 563.
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for an issue which asks if it is deceptive. If subsection 17.46(b) does not list
the act, the court should not instruct the jury that the act is deceptive, but
should leave that to an inquiry to the jury. '224 Nevertheless, the supreme
court concluded that the error about the unlisted acts was harmless be-
cause there was evidence of at least one act or practice included in subsec-
tion 17.46(b).225
In Singleton v. Pennington226 the precise question addressed in the
court's original opinion was whether the DTPA imposes liability for an
innocent misrepresentation by a seller of secondhand goods who is not in
the business of selling such goods. The defendant had represented that a
boat sold to the plaintiff was in "excellent condition," "perfect condition,"
and "just like new. "227 The statements were false, but the trial court found
that the defendant did not make the false statements knowingly or reck-
lessly. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff for actual dam-
ages and, pursuant to a pretrial stipulation, exemplary damages of $500.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the DTPA, which declares un-
lawful "[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce," '228 did not apply to him since he was not a seller
"in the business of selling." '229 The court of civil appeals, however, con-
cluded that the terms "trade" and "commerce" as defined in section
17.46(b)(6) apply to any sale of goods whether or not made in the course of
the seller's business.2 30 Hence, had there been no stipulation, treble dam-
ages would have been mandatory.23' In a strong dissent, Justice Akin con-
cluded that the DTPA "applies only to an individual or business
organization which, in the ordinary course of business, sells or leases goods
or services to consumers. ' 232 Section 17.46(c) directs the courts to be
guided by the section 17.46(b) 233 laundry list and the federal court inter-
pretations of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTCA)23 4 in determining what constitutes a deceptive trade practice
under the DTPA. According to Justice Akin's opinion, the fact situation in
Singleton "does not fall within the ambit" of a specific subdivision of sec-
224. Id. at 564.
225. Id. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Greenhill indicated that he had "grave
doubts" about the constitutionality of a treble damage award for deceptive acts or practices
not included in the laundry list of § 17.46(b). In this regard he stated:
It is one thing for the Legislature to create a cause of action in tort or contract
for actual damages caused by reliance on unfair and deceptive trade practices;
but it is another thing for it to create a penalty of triple damages for the viola-
tion of unwritten, unlisted and unspecified unlawful acts.
Id. at 565.
226. 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ granted).
227. 568 S.W.2d at 369.
228. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
229. 568 S.W.2d at 370.
230. Id.
231. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977), in which the court held that
treble damages are mandatory rather than permissive for a violation of the DTPA.
232. 568 S.W.2d at 372.
233. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
234. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
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tion 17.46(b); therefore, the court's interpretation of deceptive trade prac-
tice should be guided by the federal court interpretations of the FTCA.
Federal courts have held section 5(a)(l) of the FTCA applicable only to
"unfair acts of traders." '235 Justice Akin therefore concluded that liability
under the general language of section 17.46(a) applies only to sellers in the
business of selling, not to isolated transactions between individuals.23 6 Ul-
timately, Justice Akin's opinion was based on his view that a one-time
seller should not be subjected to treble damages and attorneys' fees for an
innocent misrepresentation since the purpose of the DTPA is "to protect
the public generally rather than to address private wrongs.,
237
On rehearing the court of civil appeals addressed the defendant's argu-
ment that section 17.46(a) of the DTPA is unconstitutionally vague be-
cause it has no definition of "[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or
practices. '' 23' The court's opinion was limited to the transaction in ques-
tion, and focused on the issue of whether section 17.46(a) put the defend-
ant on notice that an unintentional misrepresentation would make him
subject to the treble damages provision of the Act.239 In determining that
the DTPA was not unconstitutionally vague insofar as the specific fact sit-
uation in Singleton was concerned, the court set forth several interpretative
principles.
If an alleged deceptive trade practice is of the type included in the sec-
tion 17.46(b) laundry list of deceptive acts, the language of the subsection
is controlling since the courts are to be guided by section 17.46(b) "to the
extent possible." 2" Thus, if the subsection requires an intent to deceive,
"the alleged deceptive act is not in violation of the Act unless the specified
intent to deceive is shown." 24 ' According to the court, subsection
17.46(b)(13), which refers to "statements of fact concerning the need for
parts, replacement, or repair service" was applicable to the defendant's
statement that the boat was "just like new." Since subsection 17.46(b)(13)
requires that the statement be made "knowingly,, 24 2 and since the defend-
ant's misrepresentation was not made knowingly, the court set aside the
trial court's award of damages to the plaintiff.
The court of civil appeals also clarified the relationship between section
235. 568 S.W.2d at 373: see text at notes 241-44 infra.
236. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1929).
237. 568 S.W.2d at 373. In this regard, Justice Akin stated:
[N]o public interest of the people of this state will be served by making a
person who sells secondhand goods previously purchased for his own use lia-
ble for treble damages for an innocent misrepresentation. I see no logical rea-
son to treat a one-time seller the same as those who are in the business of
selling goods or services to the public, particularly with respect to treble dam-
ages and attorney's fees.
Id.
238. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
239. See id. § 17.50(b)(1).
240. Id. § 17.46(c).
241. 568 S.W.2d at 380.
242. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(13) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides that
"knowingly making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the need for parts,
replacement, or repair service" is a deceptive trade practice.
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17.46(a) and section 17.46(b), explaining that an act "of a sort not referred
to" in the section 17.46(b) laundry list may nonetheless be a deceptive
trade practice within the meaning of section 17.46(a).2 43 It is perhaps sig-
nificant that the court did not hold that a showing of intent is always re-
quired under section 17.46(a). Rather, it merely held that the section
would not be subject to a vagueness challenge if a showing of intent were
required.244 Since section 17.46(b)(13), the relevant section in Singleton,
supplies an intent requirement, the court did not reach the question
whether section 17.46(a) would be unconstitutionally vague when not con-
strued in conjunction with a subsection of 17.46(b) that supplies an intent
requirement. The court did hold, however, that "a wrongful intent to take
advantage of the buyer" is necessary to prove an "unconscionable action"
under section 17.50(a)(3) of the DTPA.
245
The Waco court of civil appeals further construed section 17.50 of the
DTPA in Woo v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp.24 6 Woo asserted a
counterclaim in the trial court for alleged violations under subsections
17.50(a)(1), (3), and (b)(1) of the DTPA in connection with the purchase of
a franchise from defendants. The opinion considered the term "adversely
affected ' 2 47 and determined the meaning of "actual damages' 24 8 as used
in the DTPA. The defendants on the counterclaim argued that the proper
measure of actual damages was the difference between the consideration
paid and the value of the franchise. Woo, on the other hand, contended
that she was entitled to receive her actual pecuniary outlay without regard
to the value of the franchise. The court held that the term "actual dam-
ages" should be construed liberally, and permitted Woo the consideration
paid by her for the distributorship as actual damages.24 9
The measure of damages under the DTPA was also a key issue in Reiger
v. DeWy/f 25° In Reiger a defendant filed a counterclaim to a plumber's
suit in quantum meruit and sought damages under the DTPA. The jury
found, however, that the counterclaimant had suffered no actual damages.
Following Cordrey v. Armstrong,25' the court of civil appeals held that in a
case seeking damages a claimant must sustain actual damages before a
243. Id. § 17.50(a)(3) allows a consumer to maintain a cause of action if he has been
adversely affected by "any unconscionable action or course of action by any person."
244. For a scathing criticism of the court's opinion on rehearing, see Maxwell, Court
Questions Whether § 1746(a) is Unconstitutionallv Vague in Certain Situations, 4 CAVEAT
VENDOR 63 (1978).
245. 568 S.W.2d at 382.
246. 565 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.c.).
247. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (a consumer may
maintain an action if he has been adversely affected by certain deceptive acts or practices).
248. Id. § 17.50(b) provides that "[in a suit filed under this section, each consumer who
prevails may obtain: (I) three times the amount of actual damages plus court costs and
attorneys' fees reasonable in relation to the amount of work expended."
249. Because the counterclaimant had sold portions of her franchise rights, amounts she
had received on the sale were deducted from the original consideration before damages were
trebled. 565 S.W.2d at 298. See also Cantrell v. First Nat'l Bank, 560 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
250. 566 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
251. 553 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ).
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recovery of attorneys' fees or other recovery can be obtained under the
DTPA.
The Houston court of civil appeals further clarified the damages provi-
sion of the DTPA252 in Riverside National Bank v. Lewis. 253 The court
held that a plaintiff may not recover both exemplary damages and treble
damages for the same act "as that would amount, at least in part, to a
double recovery of exemplary damages." '254 The appellee in Riverside
sought to transfer a car loan from the original lender to the appellant. Ini-
tially, the appellant-bank agreed to refinance the car, but later refused to
do so. The appellee's car was consequently repossessed and sold by the
first lender. The jury found that appellant's action violated the DTPA.255
The court of appeals held that appellee was a consumer,256 that an exten-
sion of credit is a service,257 and that the DTPA therefore applies to a bank
agreement to extend credit.
In Burnett v. James2 58 the appellant brought suit to recover under a re-
tail installment contract governing the sale and installation of a central air
conditioning unit in appellee's home. The appellee counterclaimed alleg-
ing that the capacity of the unit had been misrepresented. The trial court
granted rescission of the retail installment contract pursuant to subsection
17.50(b)(4) 25 9 and awarded attorneys' fees. The counterclaim, however,
did not contain a prayer for rescission. As a result, the court of civil ap-
peals reversed, holding that rescission must be prayed for specifically.260
The fact that subsection 17.50(b)(4) provides for the recovery of "any other
relief which the court deems proper" did not excuse the special pleading
requirement. 26 As a result of the court's conclusion that rescission should
not have been granted absent a proper pleading, the court also held that
the award of attorneys' fees was improper.262 Nevertheless, in the interest
252. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
253. 572 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (ist Dist.] 1978, writ granted). The
supreme court granted Riverside's application for writ of error on two points: (1) that the
court of civil appeals erred in holding that there had been a waiver of the defense of illegal-
ity, and (2) that the lower court's award of treble damages and attorneys' fees was unconsti-
tutional insofar as it constituted the imposition of penal damages on unspecified acts
prohibited by the DTPA. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 215 (Feb. 10,
1979).
254. 572 S.W.2d at 561. Compare the court's language with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.43 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
255. 572S.W.2d at 561.
256. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) defines "con-
sumer" as one "who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services."
257. Id. § 17.45(2) defines "services" as "work, labor, or service purchased or leased for
use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." See also
Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. 1977), which defines services as an "'action
or use that furthers some end or purpose: conduct or performance that assists or benefits
someone or something: deeds useful or instrumental toward some object.'"
258. 564 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd).
259. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides in
part that in a suit filed pursuant to the DTPA, a consumer who prevails may obtain "any
other relief which the court deems proper."
260. 564 S.W.2d at 409.
261. See note 259 supra.
262. 564 S.W.2d at 409.
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of justice, the court remanded the case for retrial.263
In MacDonald v. Moble/ 64 the plaintiffs based their claim for recovery
of damages in part upon a breach of an implied warranty "of fitness, gen-
eral condition and habitability" in connection with their purchase of a
home from the defendant.265 The escrow sales contract contained a provi-
sion that the lot was conveyed to the plaintiffs with all improvements "in
the same condition as it is on this date, reasonable wear and tear ex-
cepted.,266 The defendant argued that the contract language constituted a
disclaimer of the implied warranty. The court of civil appeals, however,
held that the language was not conspicuous because it was not printed in
large or contrasting type, and was therefore ineffective.2 67 A significant
aspect of the opinion is that it does not mention section 17.42 of the
DTPA, which provides that a waiver of the provisions of the DTPA is
ineffective.268
In Howze v. Surety Corp. of America26 9 the appellee filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking a determination of whether it was bound to pay a
default judgment that the appellants had obtained against R.L. Greer, who
was doing business as Mobile Market Homes. The appellants had ob-
tained the judgment against Greer in a separate action based on Greer's
false representation that he would assume the outstanding indebtedness on
a mobile home that the appellants had traded in. At the time of the mis-
representation Greer had a Mobile Home Dealer Bond 27° upon which the
appellee was the surety. Under the terms of the bond, appellee was obli-
gated to pay " 'for damages, penalties or expenses, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, resulting from a cause of action connected with the sale or
lease of a mobile home,'" if the principal violated the Texas Mobile
Homes Standards Act. 271' The appellee's claim that it was not liable for
this particular judgment rested on two theories. First, since appellee was
not a party to the suit against Greer, and had no notice of the action, it was
not bound by Greer's default judgment. The court of civil appeals agreed,
stressing that the appellee had undertaken only a general liability for vio-
lations of the Mobile Homes Standards Act, and had not agreed to be
263. Id. at 410; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 434.
264. 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
265. Id. at 917.
266. Id. at 919 (emphasis in original).
267. Id See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (Vernon 1968) which requires
disclaimers of the implied warranty of fitness to be in writing and "conspicuous." Id.
§ 1.201(10) indicates that a term is conspicuous when it is written so that a reasonable person
against whom it would operate should notice it.
268. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides: "Any
waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this subchapter is contrary to public policy and is
unenforceable and void." See also Note, Implied Warranties.- Can They Still Be Waived in
Texas?, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 440 (1974).
269. 564 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978), rey'd, 22 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 319 (Feb.
21, 1979).
270. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 522If(Vernon Supp. 1978-79) (Mobile Homes
Standards Act).
271. 564 S.W.2d at 836.
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bound by a particular judgment.272 Unless the bond provides an under-
taking that the surety is or agrees to be bound by a particular judgment, a
determination that the principal is liable does not bind the surety having
no notice of the action.273 The supreme court reversed, holding that the
bond actually was a judgment bond. Second, the appellee argued that
Greer had not violated the Mobile Homes Standards Act. Since the appel-
lants did not plead or prove that Greer had violated a mobile home war-
ranty, the court of civil appeals concluded that there was no violation of
the Mobile Homes Standards Act upon which to base a recovery. Again,
the supreme court disagreed. Recovery on a statutory surety bond, there-
fore, is for any "cause of action connected with the sale or lease of a mo-
bile home" when there is a violation of the DTPA.
As in Howze, the courts often deal with a DTPA case that also involves
other statutes. In several cases during the survey period the plaintiffs
based their claims alternatively on violations of the DTPA and the Texas
Insurance Code. In Mobile County Insurance Co. v. Jewell 74 the appellees
brought suit against a county mutual insurance company on a fire insur-
ance policy, and under the provisions of the DTPA and article 21.21, sec-
tion 16 of the Insurance Code.275 The court of civil appeals concluded that
the company was controlled by chapter 17 of the Insurance Code.276 Since
county mutual insurance companies are exempt from the operation of all
insurance laws except ones specifically enumerated in chapter 17,277 how-
ever, and since the chapter makes no reference to section 16 of article
21.21,278 the court held that the provisions of section 16 were not applica-
ble to the defendant. Therefore, article 21.21 did not constitute a statutory
basis for an award of treble damages and attorneys' fees.2 79 The court
held alternatively that since section 16 of article 21.21 refers to deceptive
acts or practices as defined by section 17.46 of the DTPA, it incorporates
only those deceptive acts or practices contained in the section 17.46(b)
laundry list, none of which were applicable. In a per curiam opinion the
supreme court stated that the court of civil appeals was correct in conclud-
ing that county mutual insurance companies are exempt from the provi-
272. Id. at 837.
273. Browne v. French, 22 S.W. 581, 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ). The Act now
requires that the surety be given notice. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f, § 13(g)
(Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
274. 555 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 566
S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1978).
275. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78) provides that an
action may be maintained by any person who has been injured by
the practices declared in Section 4 of this Article or in rules or regulations
lawfully adopted by the Board under this Article to be unfair methods of com-
petition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance
or in any practice defined by Section 17.46 of the Business & Commerce Code,
as amended.
276. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 17.01-.25 (Vernon 1963).
277. Id. art. 17.22 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
278. See note 275 supra.
279. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(b)(l) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
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sions of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code.28°
In Ceshker v. Bankers Commercial Life Insurance Co.28 the plaintiff
brought suit under the DTPA and article 21.21 of the Insurance Code,
seeking treble damages, court costs, and attorneys' fees pursuant to section
16(b)(1) of article 21.21, as well as a permanent injunction preventing fur-
ther advertisements pursuant to section 16(b)(2).282 The court of civil ap-
peals held that article 21.21, which confers rights on "any person who has
been injured,, 283 does not grant rights to individuals since a "person" is
defined as one "engaged in the business of insurance. '"284 Hence, the
plaintiff had no standing to assert a claim. The court also considered
whether the plaintiff had a cause of action under the DTPA. The court
concluded that since the plaintiff had not purchased an insurance policy
from the defendant, and consequently was not "adversely affected" within
the meaning of section 17.50 of the DTPA, he had no cause of action.285
In a per curiam opinion, the supreme court expressly disapproved of the
holding of the court of civil appeals that limited the term "person" to one
engaged in the business of insurance.286 The supreme court agreed, how-
ever, with the conclusion that a showing of injury is required.
In Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc.287 the plaintiff
brought suit on an insurance policy and, in the alternative, asserted that
the company had committed a violation of the DTPA and article 21.21 of
the Insurance Code. The basis of the appellee's DTPA and Insurance
Code claims was that if the loss in question was not covered by the policy,
then the representations of appellant's agent that the loss was covered con-
stituted false, deceptive, and misleading statements in violation of article
21.21288 and section 17.46(12)289 of the DTPA. At trial, plaintiffs claims
under the DTPA and the Insurance Code were sustained, and the plaintiff
was awarded treble damages, court costs, and attorneys' fees. On appeal,
the defendant argued that the plaintiff was not a "person" within the
meaning of article 21.21 or a "consumer" within the meaning of the DTPA
and that the plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to bring a cause of action
under either statute. In reliance upon the supreme court's per curiam
opinion in Ceshker, the court of civil appeals held that the term "person"
was not restricted to one who is engaged in the business of insurance. It
was therefore unnecessary for the court to consider whether the insured
280. 566 S.W.2d at 295.
281. 558 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 568
S.W.2d 128 (Tex. 1978).
282. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(b)(2) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1963-78).
283. See note 275 supra.
284. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 2 (Vernon 1963).
285. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides a cause of
action for a consumer who has been "adversely affected" by a violation of the Act.
286. 568 S.W.2d at 129.
287. 566 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, writ granted).
288. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(1) (Vernon 1963) defines misrepresentations
and false advertising of policy contracts as unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts.
289. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(12) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
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was a "consumer" entitled to bring an action against the insurance com-
pany pursuant to section 17.50(a) of the DTPA.29 °
The defendant-appellant also questioned whether the plaintiff suffered
any injury as a result of the misrepresentations concerning coverage. The
court of civil appeals concluded that the showing of injury was sufficient
since the misrepresentations, which were made both before and after the
insurance policy was issued, had the capacity to deceive, and since the
plaintiff had relied on them. 291 There is, however, nothing in the opinion
to suggest that other insurance would or could have been obtained by the
plaintiff had the misrepresentations about coverage not been made. The
supreme court has granted a writ of error on this question.292
In Hanssard v. Ledbetter293 suit was filed before the Sixty-fifth Legisla-
ture amended the special venue provision of the DTPA,294 so the pre-
amendment provision was controlling. Following Doyle P. Grady,295 the
court of civil appeals held that prior to the statute's amendment, proof of a
cause of action was required to sustain venue in the county where the de-




In Petereit v. Mid- West Marks, Inc. 297 a creditor sued a transferee in a
bulk transfer transaction, claiming that the transferee was personally liable
for damages in accordance with section 6.106 of the Texas Business and
290. 566 S.W.2d at 726. It seems clear that the Austin court did not mean to suggest that
the remedial provisions of the DTPA do not apply to insurance companies. Since the policy
in question was purchased in 1976 for business purposes, arguably the plaintiff was not a
"consumer" within the meaning of the DTPA prior to its amendment by the 65th Legisla-
ture. This is the apparent reason that there was some question about the applicability of
DTPA § 17.50.
291. 566 S.W.2d at 727.
292. On February 14, 1979, after the close of the survey period, the supreme court af-
firmed the court of civil appeals decision. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Bar Consultants, Inc., 577
S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1979). In so doing the court held that the plaintiff had been "adversely
affected" and "injured" by its reliance on the pre-loss representations of coverage made by
the appellant's agent. Id. at 694. Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiff's reliance
on the representation was made even more logical and reasonable by its knowledge that the
insurer had paid a similar claim in the past. Id. Thus, the pre-loss representations consti-
tuted a deceptive trade practice.
The court, however, disagreed with the court of civil appeals that the post-loss misrepre-
sentation constituted a deceptive trade practice. First, the post-loss representation of cover-
age was not within the agent's actual or apparent scope of authority. Secondly, the plaintiff
took no action based on this representation in that it would have repaired the damage re-
gardless, and therefore was not "injured" or "adversely affected." Id. at 694-95.
293. 561 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
294. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 143, § 1, at 322.
295. 543 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
296. The statute as amended provides that "[aln action brought which alleges a claim to
relief under Section 17.50 of this subchapter may be commenced in the county in which the
person against whom the suit is brought resides, has his principal place of business, or has
done business." TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
297. 564 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
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Commerce Code.2 9 8 According to the creditor, the transferee did not ful-
fill its statutory duty to assure that new consideration paid to the transferor
was applied "to pay those debts of the transferor which are either shown
on the list furnished by the transferor (Section 6.104) or filed in writing in
the place stated in the notice (Section 6.107) within thirty days after the
mailing of such notice." '299 Since the creditor did not establish that its
claim was included in the list of creditors furnished by the transferor, and
since the creditor did not file a claim within thirty days after receiving
notice of the transfer, the court of civil appeals concluded that the trial
court erred in holding the transferee liable to the creditor.
B. Offset
In Sears v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.3° the bank withdrew funds
from an account in the name of "H.A. Sears, d/b/a Sears Enterprises" to
offset Sears' alleged indebtedness to the bank. As a result, Sears brought
suit to recover the amount withdrawn. Despite the fact that the bank did
not prove Sears' indebtedness, the trial court directed a verdict for the
bank and the court of civil appeals affirmed. 3 1' The supreme court re-
versed and remanded, holding that the bank was required to justify the
offset by proving the indebtedness that supported its deduction from a de-
positor's account balance.30 2
C. Interest After Judgment
In the companion cases of Coastal Industrial Water Authority v. Trinity
Portland Cement Division, General Portland Cement Co. 3 13 and Manley v.
Sammons Enterprises, Inc.3° the supreme court held that the 1975 statu-
tory amendment to article 5069-1.05, 305 which increased the interest rates
that judgments bear from six percent to nine percent per annum, would
not be applied retroactively. Rather, the new rate applies "only to judg-
298. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.106 (Vernon 1968).
299. Id.
300. 562 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1977).
301. 553 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]), rev'd, 562 S.W.2d 843 (Tex.
1977).
302. 562 S.W.2d at 844.
303. 563 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1978).
304. 563 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1978).
305. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79) provides:
All judgments of the courts of this State shall bear interest at the rate of nine
percent per annum from and after the date of the judgment, except where the
contract upon which the judgment is founded bears a specified interest greater
than nine percent per annum, in which case the judgment shall bear the same
rate of interest specified in such contract, but shall not exceed ten percent per
annum, from and after the date of such judgment.
The amendment became effective on Sept. 1, 1975.
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ments rendered after the effective date of the statute."3 °6 It is immaterial
whether the judgment is on appeal or whether the mandate is issued after
the effective date of the statutory change.3" 7
306. 563 S.W.2d at 919.
307. Id. at 920.
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